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1. Introduction
Pension savers have had a rough time over the last decade. In the U.K. the real rate of return was   a negative  
0.1% over the period 2001-2010 and -1.1% over the period 2007-2010, according to the OECD Pension 
Outlook 2012. The same report indicates that what started as a financial crisis in 2008 amplified by a stock 
market crash and a banking rescue program absorbing 4% of GDP of the G20 group of countries, became an  
economic crisis in 2009 when real GDP growth turned negative to the tune of -3.8% across the OECD  
countries and unemployment rates rose on average by 44% from 5.9% to 8.5% of the labour forces in the  
same countries. This was followed by a fiscal crisis. In the years 2006 – 2007 the average OECD countries’ 
budget deficits were 1.2% of GDP. In 2009 the average shot up to 8.3% of GDP and over 10% for Greece,  
Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, but also for the U.K. and the U.S.
Regretfully pension savers  suffer  from financial  crises  through share and bond prices,  they suffer  from 
economic crises when the output of individuals and companies is reduced and real estate prices and company 
profits are under pressure. They also suffer from fiscal crises as doubts about government bond markets lead  
to investment losses or in the case of quantitative easing programmes lead to income and value losses.
This article does not focus on moving retirement dates till later, neither on extending the coverage of private 
pensions, but on the question of the macro economic links between funded pension savings and economic  
growth.  The  key in  understanding  what  happens  in  economies  is  that  risks  taken  by private  savers  in 
mortgage lending, in funding government debt and in buying company shares are risks which lock in all  
savers together for very long periods of time. Such risks can be transferred between savers, but collectively  
the savers cannot -in the short run- get out of the risks. In the short run, risks can only be liquidated at  
enormous costs to the savers, a highly inefficient method to protect long term savers, but also inefficient in  
the proper functioning of the capitalist economic growth system. If –in the short run- savers collectively try 
to exit the risks via the financial markets, the economies and the fiscal status of governments move into 
crises  modes.  As  matters  currently  stand pension  savers  lose  out  from all  three  crises:  a  financial,  an  
economic and a fiscal crisis.  What is needed, are risk management methods, like economic easing, which 
help eliminate the gap between short and long term objectives of savers. A dream too far? Perhaps not.
2. The 2008 Financial Crisis
The financial crisis of 2008 was caused by banks underwriting and distributing doubtful debtors claims from 
the US home mortgage markets. The size of the sub-prime mortgage market was US$ 1.2 trillion out of a  
total mortgage market of US$ 10 trillion. Why sub-prime? The acceptance criteria for these mortgages had 
been loosened. 37% were interest only mortgages. 38% of these mortgages required no down payment i.e.  
100% of home property value funded by the lenders. 43% of borrowers did not have to provide any proof of 
income and 80% of borrowers were enticed with a low start up interest period of two years, after which a  
major hike in the applicable interest rates took place. Of course, the buyers who bought these CDO packages  
thought they had the strong positive opinion of the U.S. credit rating agencies. Regretfully these opinions  
turned out  to be fundamentally flawed.  One bank went under:  Lehman Brothers.  Repossessions became  
common place and the U.S.  S&P/ Case Shiller home price index dropped from an index value of 170 by the  
end of 2007 till 130 a year later. The effects of such reckless lending practises were spread around the world,  
through the international banks who bought those CDO’s, to the government in the US which had to provide  
a major rescue package to the home mortgage markets, by helping out individuals as well as Fannie Mae and  
Freddy Mac. It also had a major impact on the building trade in the US and on the stock markets around the  
world. In other words the financial, economic and fiscal crises were interwoven. The origin of the 2008 crisis 
can be found in imprudent lending practices by turning savings into assets –homes- by giving home loans to 
people who – on a large scale- could not afford to pay back such loans. Once the savings conversion had 
taken place the risks were packaged and sold around the world. When the imprudence came to light in 2008, 
suddenly a large number of homes were repossessed and such numbers could not quickly be turned back into 
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cash, without the savers –this time to be found around the world- taking large losses on cash flows and on 
U.S. house values. As indicated in the OECD report, the ripple effects were enormous, much larger than the 
original size of the sub prime mortgage market of US$ 1.2 trillion.
Just as an illustration, the US pension fund industry was equally affected. The DB schemes lost 30% of their 
asset values in 2008 or around US$ 1 trillion. Probably the DC schemes, which have the larger share of the  
US pension markets, did not do much better. At the end of 2008 the size of the US private pension fund 
industry  stood  at  US$  8.2  trillion  and  in  individual  retirement  accounts  another  $3.6  trillion  was 
accumulated.  Another  effect  was on US companies  which underwrote  the  investment  risks  in  their  DB 
pension schemes. Due to the drop in financial markets and the effect of the Pension Protection Act of 2008, 
US companies had to double their pension deficit  contribution from US$ 45 billion in 2008 till US$ 90  
billion in 2009, a doubling in contributions in times of recession.
Last but not least, the derivatives markets accelerated market movements in the financial market place by 
trading  heavily  in  credit  derivatives.  Combined  with  the  stock  market  crash  and  the  bank  failures  the  
derivative  trades  further  enhanced  the  negative  impact  on  financial  markets  in  the  world.  It  became  a 
multiple of the actual loss on these mortgages. Together individuals, banks, life insurance companies and 
pension funds lost in savings terms and governments and companies lost in income terms. Banks exposed to  
higher credit  losses will  reduce lending levels,  especially when house prices drop and economic growth  
stagnates. All in all these events turned into having a major multiplier effect.
3. Risks to Savers
3.1 Mortgage Lending Crisis
In the 2008 crisis, worldwide savings found their way into funding homes in the U.S.: a money conversion  
into fixed assets. Through imprudent practices these assets did not yield the expected cash flows and the loss 
to savers were compounded by the subsequent steep drop in U.S. house prices. Savers suffered both a cash-
flow and a value loss. What is striking is that while some individuals or some banks, pension funds or asset  
managers might not have been individually affected, the collective of savers could not have avoided such 
losses. What did take place was a savers swap, between the original fund providers and the ultimate holders  
of the risks. The risks were embedded in the cash-into-asset conversion process. In normal circumstances it  
takes families often 20 to 30 years to earn enough to pay back their mortgages.  Once the savings were  
converted into brick and mortar, the reverse process cannot be speeded up into a shorter time span than some  
20 or 30 years. The collective of savers entered into a similarly long term cash to asset conversion process.  
Once the cash flows out of  these assets became doubtful or non existent,  the negative impact  occurred.  
Trying to get out of such a process rapidly is not possible without the collective of savers suffering heavy 
losses,  both  in  cash  flows  and  in  valuation  losses.  The  U.S.  case  is  a  prime  example  thereof.   Many 
individuals lost their homes and the home prices dropped steeply in 2008. The U.S. Government lost heavily 
both through supporting individuals and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as through a reduced tax 
income.  Companies  lost  out  as  building firms  and related services  suffered heavily through the sudden 
overhang  of  many  repossessed  homes,  for  which  new  buyers  were  needed,  but  could  not  be  found.  
Companies also lost out through their Defined Benefit pension schemes which needed large amounts of cash 
injections due to share and bond market falls. Banks around the world were exposed and some were rescued 
by governments. Pension funds suffered as well. The result was that even those individuals not personally 
involved, suffered indirectly through involvement in the savings markets. The risks could not be laid off for  
the collective of savers.
3.2 The Case of Spain
Take the case of Spain. The cause of its current crisis has very little to do with the Euro as a currency or with 
the Spanish government acting imprudently,  but all to do with some banks turning savings into 800 000 
homes which could not be sold to potential buyers. What other European governments might have done to  
help manage these risks from spreading to the Spanish economy and Spanish government is setting up a 
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second home acquisition scheme for their own nationals rather than to lend Euro 100 billion to the Spanish  
government for channelling these funds to the Spanish banks. The latter injection equates to Euro 125 000 
for each unsold home.  The problem could have been solved much more  effectively by supporting their  
nationals- Mr Smith, Herr Schmidt, Hr Schmidt, Meneer Smit and Monsieur Forgeron- in buying homes in 
Spain from the Spanish population with the help of about 20% of the amount i.e. Euro 25 000 per home. If  
the lending is also executed by German, British, French, Dutch, Swiss, Austrian and Scandinavian banks  
than the inward capital movement into Spain will help solve the real estate crisis, part of the banking crisis  
and a substantial part of the government debt crisis. Give potential foreign buyers a subsidy of Euro 25 000  
for  their  Spanish property;  the latter  should be of a minimal  value of  Euro 150 000,  which equates to  
properties of 120 sq meters in the Spanish Mediterranean Coastal provinces. Such potential buyers should  
themselves put in an amount minimally equal to the governments’ injection. The remainder amount should 
be up to the foreign bank’s credit judgment. The buyers should also agree not to sell the properties for a  
minimum of five years. The sellers should be either the Spanish banks or Spanish families moving home.  
The Bank of Spain could supervise the scheme. Of course the scheme would be stopped as and when the  
supply of homes comes nearer to the full utilisation levels.
The consequences: The Spanish property markets will turn around pretty quickly; a place in the sun is still a 
dream for many Northern Europeans. The Spanish banks will be relieved from their property overhang on  
which no cash flow is received while their borrowings still carry interest costs. The Spanish people who sell  
and move to other properties will usually have more cash available as 50% of homes are owned in Spain 
without a mortgage. European governments usually operate either capital gains taxes or income taxes on  
second properties, so they will get their money back in due course. Last but not least the capital inflows into  
Spain and the strengthening of the banking sector plus the additional tourist incomes will help the Spanish 
economy to turn around as well. This comes all at a fraction of the costs of the Euro 100 billion. Spanish  
government  bond  yields  will  come  down  as  well.  The  example  is  just  one  of  the  ways  in  which 
understanding the causes of the risks to savers can help devise sound solutions. The “perceived risk” outlook  
for Spain will fundamentally change by implementing this scheme.
3.3 Government Bonds and Company Shares  
If one looks at the two other major investment categories: government bonds and company shares, it is  
striking how close these categories resemble fixed assets. For instance outstanding government bond levels  
can never be repaid in any normal economic manner. It would undermine the fabric of an economy. This  
means that once savings are converted into government bonds, the nature of such bond holdings are for  
extremely long periods, as governments keep on borrowing over and above outstanding debt levels. Short 
term bonds are basically as risky as long term government bonds as the collective of savers can not get out of 
the risks any time soon. Buying into government bonds represents a cash flow into asset conversion, not  
based on brick and mortar but based on the future level of tax payments. The reverse process, if applied at  
anything else than an extremely slow pace, will undermine an economy.
 The same applies to company shares. Once issued, the only way to get some money back is by companies 
deciding to buy back some of the shares. Otherwise the cash flow risks and the risks to the value of the  
savings are held by the collective of savers. Again for both categories savers swaps may and often will take  
place, but the risks remain with the collective of savers. For shares to be turned back into cash flows would 
mean closure of companies and full scale liquidation.
For all these three investment categories the risks are extremely long term, and a reverse conversion process  
is practically impossible, hence the conclusion that the collective of savers cannot get out of such risks other 
than by taking substantial losses in the short term.
3.4 Real Sector versus Financial Markets
In the real sector of an economy, a risk to an entrepreneur finishes once the good or service has been sold to  
the markets when a price has been agreed and cash flow changes hands. For savers, once savings have been 
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converted into real estate, government bonds or company shares, the collective savers are in these assets for  
very long periods of times. Individual savers can exit during these periods by finding other savers to take  
over their risks, but the collective savers cannot get out of such risks. The price quoted for these assets in  
financial and in real estate markets is a dual price. These prices reflect the risks to both cash flows and to  
future  values.  Predicting  cash  flows  can normally be done quite  accurately over  short  periods  of  time.  
However future values of shares, government bonds and homes are based on assessments by the markets on 
“perceived risks”.  “Perceived risk” assessments  are  not  based on what  will  happen,  but  on what  might  
happen. Such “perceived risk” assessments can easily be wrong. This leads to erroneous price fixing in the  
financial and real estate markets. Financial markets exuberance and despondency are known phenomena.  
They are based on the herd effects of following others. When such herd effects are guided by despondency 
and wrong prices, than this leads to savers wanting to protect their principal values of such savings and get  
out of the share, bond or real estate markets and back into cash. Such rushed demand for mass conversion out 
of long term assets can only be achieved by collectively accepting mass losses, which are in no way linked to 
the true value of these assets,  being the net present value of future cash flows out of these assets. Such 
financial losses as expressed in real estate price crashes, stock market crashes and even government bond 
market  crashes  affect  the  banking  sectors  as  they  are  unable  to  request  their  borrowers  to  repay their  
mortgage loans quicker. The borrowers, who are simultaneously savers in their homes, sometimes see their 
savings eroded and enter negative equity situations. Companies see their sales drop. Governments see their  
incomes drop. The wrong prices, based on the wrong “perceived risks”, lead to the wrong economic outcome  
with huge losses on savings and subsequent economic recessions. 
The key economic dilemma is how to bridge the gap between the short and the long term objectives of  
savers. The savings into asset conversions (homes, government bonds and shares) tie in the collective of 
savers for very long periods. The desire to get out of such risks in the short run when “perceived risks” take a 
turn for the worst, leads to financial market pressures and prices which are irrational from the long term  
perspective. The financial markets pull the real economies into recessions, by the very elements the OECD 
report mentions: cash flows and values. The possible solutions lie in governments defining risk management 
strategies, which help to limit the negative effects of perceived risks and thereby help those who have put  
money aside for  future  consumption,  to  make  a  positive  return over  inflation.  Without  private  savings,  
governments  could not  exist,  even if it  was only for funding debts created in the past.  Without  private 
savings homes could not be bought and without private savings companies would neither have shares issued 
to outside savers nor have bond and loans available to operate.
4. Perceived risks and pension funds
Before continuing, one has to make clear, how pension assets and liabilities should be defined, rather than 
using current perceptions. A pension fund liabilities are all the funds, saved by individuals and sometimes by  
companies on behalf of individuals, and collected by the fund in the form of contributions. Such liabilities  
are used to buy financial assets. These assets are used to fulfil the promises on future payouts on individual  
pensions. The latter promise also involves an asset conversion process from financial assets back into cash  
pay outs. Actuaries base their predictions on assessing longevity risk together with the adequacy level of the 
assets to pay out the promised pensions, the so called coverage ratio. The latter has to be based on some  
indication of applied interest rates. It is here where the problems start. By lack of a better evaluation method  
the day-to-day yield is often used as the benchmark for valuing the asset portfolio of bonds and so is the day-
to-day price for shares. Sometimes a rolling three months average is used, but never are any long term yield  
yardsticks used that come close to reflecting  the long term nature of saving up for a pension pot. If perceived 
risks assessments in financial and real estate markets can get their predictions wrong, than pension funds, as 
very long term saving institutions, can never asses their coverage ratios correctly. 
What would be best for pension funds, but also for economies, is for governments to start managing such 
risks.  For  the  U.S.  in  2008  the  problems  were  created  by misjudging  cash  flows  originating  from the  
subprime sector of the domestic home markets. For Spain their problems started by some banks converting 
savings into 800000 homes for which there were no buyers. A possible risk management method to help 
solve Spain’s home risk crisis was suggested above.  
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Government bonds yields can also by influenced by short term rather than long term savers actions. This  
leads to yield gaps between these two types of actions; an overshooting or undershooting of government 
bond yields.  At  the  moment  Spain and Italy suffer  from overshooting and countries  like  Germany and 
Holland from undershooting. The U.K. and the U.S. also suffer from undershooting, however for different  
reasons. The next section will focus on the UK situation.
5. The current UK situation
According to the Pension Protection Fund, in the month of May 2012,  the 6432 remaining final salary 
private sector funds saw their collective deficit grow with UK£ 95 billion or 50% over the previous month.  
Over the last year till May the total deficit is now 13 times higher than 12 months ago at £ 312 billion.  Total 
assets were £1031 billion and total liabilities £ 1343 billion. 5503 schemes were in deficit and 929 in surplus. 
On top of the £ 1 trillion in DB schemes, the UK has another £900 billion in DC schemes saved up as per  
end 2011 according to TheCityUK.
One has to add another savings element to these totals.  It is common in the U.K. to buy an annuity from life  
insurance  companies  on  or  near  the  date  of  retirement.  The  life  insurance  companies  in  the  U.K.  are  
responsible for another £ 1.7 trillion in invested savings assets.
The efforts and government decisions to postpone the retirement age and to widen the level of contributors to  
pension schemes help in the very long run but do not take away the miserable investment results over the  
past 13 years.  The outlook remains poor, unless the U.K economy gets a boost and unless the Bank of  
England changes its policy towards the long term yield curve of U.K. government bonds. 
For the U.K. the key element for pension funds, but also for life insurance companies and banks is the  
negative real return on government bonds and indirectly the negative returns on shares as the economy is 
stalling. One cannot hope for economic growth or for a decent pension if long term savings are not rewarded 
with positive real interest rates. For U.K. banks, their costs of funds exceed the returns on 10 year U.K. 
government bonds, so holding these government bonds -supposed to be the safest asset- is a loss making 
operation, undermining the whole equity structure of U.K. banks. For life insurance companies it means  
lowering the value of the annuity pay out for people who have saved all their working life for a pension. For  
the savers it means that saving is not profitable, so they stop saving, while all economic agents need such  
savings.
All pension savers are taxpayers, but not all taxpayers save for a pension. The current yield of 1.78% on 10  
year  bonds compares with the long term average yield of 6.1%.  The current  yield has been artificially 
doctored  by the  Bank of  England (the  Bank)  by buying  up  £  325 billion  out  about  £1trillion  of  U.K. 
government  debt.  The  undershoot  has  occurred  as  a  consequence  of  the  Bank  using  an  instrument  – 
quantitative easing which lowers long term yields on gilts- for short term purposes. In this case it was not  
that the financial markets got their pricing wrong, but government action by the Bank that brought down the  
yield. Managing the gap between the short and long term actions by savers requires market intervention by  
the Bank in the gilts markets. It is a contradiction in terms in using the long term gilts markets for supplying 
short term liquidity to the banking sector. Funding for lending programmes can do the same job without any  
interference in the gilts markets. 
A quantitative easing programme puts an unequal –some might go as far as say unfair- competition element  
in the private savings markets. The Bank can create money at 0% interest rate costs. Banks need to reward  
their savers and so do pension funds. They need a positive yield over their costs of funds. Hence they cannot  
compete with the Bank.
What should be such yield? The long term average yield has been 6.1%. In the last  three years,  which  
coincided with the Bank’s QE programme, the real return has turned strongly negative. In September 2009 
the positive spread of yield over inflation was still 2.15%; from January to June 2010 this difference had 
dropped to 0.1%; in the second half of 2010 the yield difference became a negative 0.6%; for the first half of  
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2011 it went to a further negative 0.95%; in the second half of 2011 it went down to minus 2.2% and it 
stayed negative to the tune of minus 1.5% over the first five months of 2012.
The Bank of England announced its first Quantitative Easing exercise in March 2009 with an amount to be  
purchased of £ 75 billion over the course of 2009. It followed it up with subsequent purchases over the next  
two years with additional purchases of £ 275 billion out of a total U.K. government debt of approximately £  
1 trillion. 
There has been no period since 1990 that the 10 year yield on U.K. gilts was not a positive 2% or more over  
U.K. inflation rate in the same period, apart from the period since September 2009.
Managing financial risks is not done by creating inflation and is also not done by discouraging private sector 
savings. The U.K. government needs private savings to fund its past debt and current deficit coverage. U.K.  
companies need those savings and so do the property markets. Banks need the positive income from gilts to  
manage their credit risks better. Creating stability in the long term U.K. government gilt market should be a  
normal part of the Bank’s operations.  The logical target is around 2% over the inflation level, the latter  
currently at 2.75%, so the ten year gilt yield should be around 4.75%.  The U.K. economy is seen as a safe  
haven economy. In these circumstances to gradually jack up yields to 4.75% should not be difficult in any 
way, local and foreign savers will jump at the opportunity. Buying and selling operations can help stabilise  
the gilt markets, but under- or overshooting is detrimental to the overall economy and to any saver in the  
country. It is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of short and long term savers’ actions. 
6. Pension Funds and Economic Growth
The traditional manner to stimulate economic growth was the Keynesian method of using private savings to  
fund government deficit spending in the current periods. The traditional manner has most likely reached its  
limitations for the U.K. and other countries as government debt levels have reached from 80 to over 100% of  
GDP levels. Another way in which such economic stimulus can be executed is to allow all pension funds and 
life insurance companies to collectively inject 2% of Britain’s GDP, equalling £35 billion into the household 
sector this year. This amount is less than 2% of the assets held by these funds and companies. In order not to 
disturb financial markets,  the Bank of England could advance these funds to the pension funds and life  
companies till new cash inflows from pension contributions, dividends and interest flows make up for this 
amount. Pension funds etc. could distribute such funds –preferably tax free- on an equal amount basis to all  
pension savers and retirees drawing a pension already- equal to reflect that new savers will have to contribute 
for  a  very long time  until  receiving  benefits-.   The  recipients  need  to  get  the  message  from the  U.K. 
government that it is vital to the economic health of the country to spend the additional income rather than 
save it. If done, the £ 35 billion will set off the demand pull injection which in the past was funded via the 
government’s  deficit  creation. Once these savings injections have raised growth rates to 2% per annum,  
government tax revenues will have increased and out such tax revenues the pension funds etc. could be 
repaid for their loss of reserves. The costs to taxpayers could be set at CPI plus 2% over the period that the 
funds were used for creating the economic stimulus. The U.K. Government debt levels will not increase; real  
savings will be converted into consumption when the economy needs it and the taxpayers will return these 
savings when economic  growth levels have reached the desired level.  All  sectors of the U.K. economy 
benefit. It will lead to lower unemployment levels, to higher company outputs and profits, to lower risks for 
the banking sector and to higher government revenues levels. It will also lead to improved share prices based  
on  higher  company  profits.  The  “pension  dividend”  method  represents  a  different  way  of  managing 
economic risks, which could be applied not just in the U.K., but in The Netherlands and in the U.S. as well.  
What is also encouraging is that the pension dividend method can be started up and stopped much more 
easily than governments can control their extra spending once Keynesian programmes have been formulated  
and started up.
7. The Euro and government bond yields
The 17 Eurozone countries share one currency, but each country has a different inflation rate, a different rate  
of economic growth, a different level of unemployment, a different level of outstanding government debt and 
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a  different  state  of  its  banking  sectors.  Managing  the  gap  risks  between  short  and  long  term savings  
intentions needs positive government actions.
This could be done as follows: Countries like Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,  
France and Finland could attract 10 year funds from the financial markets not for government spending but  
for depositing these funds as reserves at the ECB.  As an example, Germany could use these powers till its  
borrowing yield would reach 3.9%, 2% over its current inflation level. These savings remain German savings 
at the ECB. For the other funding countries their inflation rate plus 2% would be the yard stick. The ECB 
could with these funds, subsequently buy up government debt of the other 10 countries provided that they  
follow the fiscal pact. In the case of Spain, which always had a very prudent central government, its inflation  
rate is also 1.9%, so the ECB would buy current Spanish bonds at 7% and subsequently lower yields till the 
Spanish yield also stands at 3.9%. As an example,  ECB’s interest  income from Spanish bonds plus the 
positive difference in yield over German and other funder government bonds will be distributed over the 
funders pro rata of their funding contribution. In this way the costs of issuing more government debt than 
needed for own government expenditure of the 7 countries is fully met by the income from bonds of the 10  
countries held by the ECB. If yields would undershoot the target, the ECB could sell more of its holdings of 
bonds of one of the 10 countries or one of the 7 countries could issue more government bonds for which the 
proceeds are to be deposited at the ECB. The fiscal implications are neutral in that the taxpayers in the 7 
countries have no future tax obligations based on the additional borrowing levels. The 7 countries can issue  
more debt, but the funds are not used for domestic expenditure. Fiscal prudence stays intact. The action is  
aimed at maintaining financial stability across the Eurozone, rather than increasing government expenditure 
levels in any participating Eurozone country. The interest costs will be met by the real borrowers, the 10  
nations. The fund suppliers –the 7 nations- get an extra income, while the taxpayers in the 10 countries  
benefit from the balancing act of the ECB. The ECB does not need to rely on money printing, but on moving  
real private savings within the Eurozone countries. The risks involved are minimal as the 10 countries can 
fund their government bond obligations, not on wrongly “perceived risks” but on actual realised risks. By  
lowering the overall risk level in the Eurozone countries all countries benefit. Of course, the criterion for  
assisting the 10 countries is that they apply the fiscal pact requirements. Executing such a balancing act has 
to be done on a daily basis; only the ECB is up to this task. The European Financial Stability Fund cannot  
operate in the required manner. The financial markets will relish this type of market stabilisation by the ECB 
and private sector fund flows will soon return to the higher paying Eurozone countries, making intervention 
unnecessary.
8. The Eurozone and Economic Growth
In order to get the economies in the 10 countries growing again, some may need some help. The European 
Financial Stability Fund may need to set up for these countries, which do not have sizeable funded pension 
savings, a similar scheme as the pension dividend injection scheme of the U.K.  Such facility is an economic 
loan to foreign taxpayers, to be repaid as and when economic growth rates have reached their targets. Such  
economic loans should only carry the taxpayers’ guarantees, but not the governments’ ones. For Spain one 
could think of about 2% of GDP or Euro 35 billion, to be handed out, tax free, to all households on an equal 
basis, perhaps in semi annual instalments. This injection –an economic easing scheme- might need to be 
repeated in 2013. Repayments should start when economic growth rates have reached their desired levels.  
Again governments  need to get  the message across  that  spending the received monies  is  needed to get  
employment levels up as well as economic growth in the self interest of all concerned.
9. Conclusions
The conversion of savings into real estate, government bonds and company shares creates long term time  
risks on cash flows and values. Such risks can be managed by governments by devising appropriate risk  
management strategies, like a home buying programme for foreigners buying up the overhang of Spanish 
properties, like a bond yield management programme, a pension dividend scheme and an economic easing  
programme to strengthen economic growth rates. Once private financial markets conclude that risks are well  
managed, the other risks, such as banking risks become automatically more manageable. Fiscal austerity and 
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economic growth policies can go hand in hand as long as savers feel that their interests are properly looked 
after and rewarded. DB schemes will become less costly for companies to maintain and funded pension  
funds will become much more popular as their yields will increase. The losses on savings will be reduced  
and economic efficiency enhanced. Even accountants and actuaries can sleep better.
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